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The aim of this paper is to use the theoretical distinction between wage-led and profit-led econo-mies to consider the impact of internal devaluation policy on GDP growth for the case of Spain. We assess to what extent wage devaluation in Spain has proven useful vis-à-vis triggering an export-led strategy, boosting aggregate demand and overcoming the crisis.For said purpose, we estimate a Bhaduri-Marglin model drawing on quarterly data from Eurostat, and we expand the traditional model to take into account the effect of private debt on consump-tion and investment. Our main conclusion is that the Spanish economy can be characterized as a wage-led economy, and that therefore a wage share decrease proves counterproductive to growth. According to our calculations, internal devaluation policy detracted an average of 0.3 percentage points of annual economic growth during the period 2010-2016.
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51. - IntroductionOne of the main economic measures promoted by the governments of peripheral eurozone countries in an effort to overcome the Great Recession of 2008 was the policy of internal devaluation. In Spain, this policy was applied between 2010 and 2016, as a result of pres-sure from the European authorities, and has 
been justified using two arguments.Firstly, internal devaluation is prescribed to correct external imbalances. After the estab-lishment of European Monetary Union, pe-ripheral countries accumulated important ex-
ternal deficits with the core economies of the eurozone. Since nominal devaluation of the exchange rate is no longer possible, internal devaluation (understood as a reduction in unit labor costs) is posited by EU institutions as the only way to rebalance price competitiveness among monetary union members.Secondly, the European authorities also argue that, in a context characterized by domestic de-
mand shortfall and fiscal austerity measures, internal devaluation helps to restore economic growth. The impulse of external demand as a result of improved price-competitiveness should offset the decline in domestic demand 
caused by both fiscal austerity measures and by a general reduction in wages. Thus, if inter-nal devaluation actually works, it should there-fore trigger an export-led growth recovery.Has internal devaluation policy proved suc-cessful in Spain? Many voices proclaim that it has (Domenech et al., 2015; Bank of Spain, 2015; European Commission, 2016), given that Spain corrected its external imbalances and grew at an annual rate of 3.2% in 2015-2016.The present paper aims to use the theoretical 
distinction between wage-led and profit-led economies to consider the impact of internal devaluation policy on GDP growth for the case of Spain. We assess to what extent wage deval-uation in Spain has proved useful in triggering an export-led strategy, boosting aggregate de-mand and overcoming the crisis.
The distinction between wage-led and profit-led economies is presented by the Bhaduri-Marglin model, a post-Kaleckian model that describes the causal links between functional income distribution and economic growth (Bhaduri and Marglin, 1990). We adopt this theoretical approach in our research.According to this model, lower consump-tion expenditure and a higher volume of net exports, as well as simultaneous opposite ef-fects on the demand for investment should be expected after a reduction in the wage share. 
The final effect of a change in functional in-come distribution on aggregate demand is 
undetermined, and depends on the specific 
characteristics of each economy. Specifically, it depends on the elasticity of consumption, in-vestment and net exports to a change in wages, 
profits, labor costs and prices. In other words, it is an empirical issue. Of course, each regime 
–whether wage-led or profit-led– leads to dif-ferent policy implications that should be taken into account when authorities seek to support 
a sufficient level of aggregate demand.Since internal devaluation policy has led to a change in functional income distribution in the Spanish economy, furthering the downward trend of the wage share ratio of the last few decades (Figure 1)1, we can use the Bhaduri-Marglin model as a tool to gauge the impact of wage devaluation on economic growth.Following this theoretical approach, we esti-mate a Bhaduri-Marglin model for the period 1995-2016, focusing particular attention on the years of internal devaluation (2010-2016). We expand the model so as to consider the effect of private debt on consumption and in-vestment, which is of major importance in the case of Spain. In addition, we use quarterly data in order to obtain a greater number of ob-servations, and thus be able to use the model for analyzing a short period of time.
1 The increase in wage share observed in Spain during the early years of the Great Recession is due to the so-called “composition effect”: temporary jobs, the lowest 
paid, are the first to be destroyed with the onset of the crisis, leading to a spurious increase in the average salary of employees.
6In recent years, there have been several em-pirical studies based on this model aimed at determining the macroeconomic consequenc-
es of redistribution towards profits or wages. 
Briefly, two general conclusions can be drawn 
from this research: 1) many studies find major OECD economies to be wage-led demand re-gimes. Therefore, policies that depress wages cause net contractionary effects; 2) when the decrease in the wage share takes place simul-taneously in a group of countries (for example, the eurozone), even those economies that ini-
tially appeared to be profit-led, become wage-led when considering macroeconomic effects as a whole. In this context, the current policy of internal devaluation proves counterproduc-tive, since it produces a recessive bias. Our research contributes to this literature through three elements. First, we put the Bha-duri-Marglin model at the service of a short term economic policy analysis in order to ex-plore the appropriateness of the internal de-valuation policy applied during the crisis. Said model is normally used to characterize the structural nature of an economy rather than 
to assess a specific policy implemented in an economy during a given period.
Second, the empirical literature which uses this 
approach has been confined almost exclusively to major OECD economies or, on some occa-sions, to certain emerging countries. Eurozone peripheral countries have rarely been included in the analyses and there is no in-depth study of the Spanish economy in the literature that draws on the Bhaduri-Marglin model.Third, few articles expand the Bhaduri-Marglin 
model to include financial variables, although there are some notable exceptions as will be seen in section 3. We feel that it is essential to 
do this since financialization has significantly altered the main macroeconomic drivers over the past two decades. Ignoring such a phenom-enon might lead to possible bias in the empiri-cal estimates.The structure of our research is as follows. Af-ter this introduction, in the second section we analyze the strategy of internal devaluation in Spain, and its supposed rationale. In section three, we examine whether the Spanish econo-
my is wage-led or profit-led, and in the fourth section we evaluate the effects of internal de-valuation on economic growth. Finally, in the 
fifth section we present our conclusions and draw some economic policy implications.
Figure 1. Adjusted wage share, Spain, 1995-2016 (% GDP)
*Note. Adjusted wage share is used: compensation per employee as percentage of GDP at market prices per person employed. Source: AMECO
72. Internal devaluation policy in 
the Spanish economy
2.1 What is it and how does internal de-
valuation policy theoretically work?
Internal devaluation can be defined as a set of economic policy measures designed to achieve a reduction in wages and unit labor costs (ULC) 
so as to secure lower inflation than is present in international competitors. The ultimate goals of this policy are to improve external competitiveness, correct external imbalances and restore economic growth.Since 2010, wage moderation in Spain has not only been the result of the crisis itself –weak-ening the bargaining power of workers– but also the product of successive labor market reform laws (2010, 2011 and 2012). These reforms, particularly the one implemented in 2012, decentralized collective bargaining, reduced the regulatory scope and duration of collective agreements, facilitated opt-out clauses and alleviated dismissal costs and pro-cedures (OECD, 2013; Cruces et al., 2015).According to the rationale of internal devalua-tion, a decrease in nominal wage growth, and lower ULC growth, are required to achieve enhanced price competitiveness aimed at increasing net exports. A reduction in ULC 
should result in a lower rate of inflation of do-mestically produced goods and services. Nev-
ertheless, fulfilling such a condition depends 
on profit margin performance and the degree to which changes in labor costs are passed on to prices. Furthermore, as competitiveness is a relative concept, what is needed is not only a decrease 
in domestic inflation but also lower price in-creases compared to those of other countries. The problem is, of course, that other counties might well be applying a similar strategy at the same time. If higher price-competitiveness is 
actually achieved, the final effect on current account will depend on the price elasticity of exports and imports.When changes in nominal wages are passed on 
to prices in full, and profit margins remain con-
stant, real wages and wage share should also remain unaltered. However, if the decrease in 
price inflation is less sharp than the decrease 
in wage inflation, as has been the case in Spain, internal devaluation will have distributional consequences and spark a reduction in wage share (as seen in Figure 1).Internal devaluation might also affect net ex-ports through a second channel: its negative impact on domestic demand, given that private consumption depends positively on wages. Only if private investment offsets this restric-tive effect will domestic demand grow slowly, which would slow down imports and improve the balance of goods and services. Furthermore, internal devaluation is not only prescribed as a tool to correct external imbalances but also as an instrument to boost economic growth. Positive effects of this economic policy would, theoretically, be the outcome of two combined forces:  
	Price competitiveness recovery would lead to an increase in net exports, offsetting the restrictive effect of wage cuts on internal demand and boosting aggregate demand.
	Improved profit margins would be used by companies to restore investment, therefore boosting new production and new labor demand.
2.2 Implementing internal devaluation 
in Spain and its consequencesIn this section, we see how the causal chains explained in the previous section have not ac-tually occurred in Spain2. We examine how the reduction in ULC has only partially translated 
into lower inflation and improved external competitiveness, whilst internal devaluation has in fact depressed domestic demand.Nominal employee compensation clearly fell after 2010 (Figure 2), reaching negative an-
nual growth rates during five quarters (2012-2013). As apparent labor productivity was si-multaneously growing faster because of labor adjustments, ULC evidenced an even sharper 2 For a more in-depth analysis, see Uxó et al. (2016)
8contraction. This has led to almost eliminating the devia-tion between Spanish and eurozone ULC that occurred between 1999 and 2008 (Figure 3). In the third semester of 2016, the accumulated increase in ULC since EMU began is only 3.6% higher in Spain than in the eurozone. This re-maining difference is due to the fact that wage restraint has been applied simultaneously in 
other eurozone countries, not only in Spain, such that the average ULC growth rate in the monetary union has also decreased. Indeed, had the average ULC grown at a pace compati-
ble with the 2% inflation target set by the ECB, 
the gap would be negative. Thus, the first step of the above-described internal devaluation 
policy has been fulfilled: the decrease in nomi-nal wages has led to a decrease in ULC relative to competitors.
Figure 2. Nominal wages and unit labor costs, Spain (annual growth rate)
Source: Eurostat and author’s calculations
Figure 3. Nominal unit labor costs, Spain (1999Q1=100)
Source: Eurostat and author’s calculations
9The inflation rate in Spain has also decreased since 2010. The average growth rate of the 
GDP deflator was 3.9% between 1999 and 2007, and only 0.2% between 2010 and 2016. However, the reduction in ULC has not fully 
translated into a lower rate of inflation. While the accumulated decrease in ULC between 2009Q4 and 2016Q3 was -6%, the GDP 
deflator registered an accumulated increase of 1%. As can be seen in Figure 4, this is explained 
because profit margins have been increasing at an average annual growth rate of 0.5%, while wages and ULC have been falling. That is, changes in labor costs have only been partially passed on to prices, which has had distributive effects3.
3 Indeed, the fact that internal devaluation strategy was based on this change in income distribution is what al-lows us to use the Bhaduri-Marglin model to test the suit-ability of the strategy to support economic growth.
Figure 4. Contributions to the growth rate of GDP deflator, Spain 
Source: Eurostat and author’s calculations
As the decrease in price inflation has been less 
sharp than the decrease in wage inflation, the real wage fell between 2010 and 2013 (Figure 
5). This is true if we use the GDP deflator (real wages from the employers’ standpoint), but is particularly acute if we take the HCPI as an indicator of the cost of living (real wage from the workers’ perspective). Finally, lower real wages and accelerating labor productivity stemming from mass dismissals have meant a decrease in real ULC (Figure 6), or wage share.
10
Figure 5. Real wage (2009 = 100), Spain 
Source: Eurostat and author’s calculations
Figure 6. Real ULC (2009=100), Spain 
Source: Eurostat and author’s calculations
11
Figure 7. Real Effective Exchange Rate (37 main partners, 2009=100), Spain 
Source: Eurostat and author’s calculations
To what extent have these developments in ULC and prices meant an improvement in price competitiveness? To gauge this, we use the real effective exchange rate for 37 major trading partners, obtained using unit labor costs 
(REER-ULC) and the price deflator of exports (REER-EXP). Considering 2009 as the base year, Spain recorded a 14% real depreciation in terms of ULC. Nevertheless, this depreciation is seen to be much lower when measured in terms of export prices (the REER-EXP has only decreased by 3%, as can be seen in Figure 7). This is explained by the fact that the decline 
in ULC is mainly captured by profit margins, as stated earlier, and because the rest of the 
eurozone has also registered inflation rates well below 2%. As can be seen in Table 1, actual export growth during the period 2010-2016 as well as its con-tribution to GDP growth, is only slightly higher than was experienced by the Spanish economy during the years prior to the economic crisis. Hence, the rapid adjustment of the Spanish ex-ternal sector (going from a borrowing position of over 10% in 2008 to a lending one of 2% in 2015), and its net contribution to economic growth in recent years, has not been so much the result of the rapid growth in exports but rather the consequence of the collapse of im-ports.
Table 1. Spanish external sector.
Spain 2001-2007 2010-2013 2014-2016
Contribution to GDP growth
Domestic Demand 4.4% -2.9% 2.8%External Demand -0.9% 1.5% 0.0%Exports 1.0% 1.4% 1.4%Imports -1.9% 0.1% -1.5%Total GDP 3.6% -1.5% 2.8%Real growth rate Exports 4.1% 4.4% 4.5%Imports 6.7% -1.6% 5.2%Export market share* 2.3 1.9 1.9*Goods and services, % of world total, the last period corresponds to years 2014-15.Source: Eurostat and author’s calculations.
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The recent adjustment of the external sector and the evolution of economic growth in Spain are mainly explained by the progress of domestic demand (Figure 8), and not by an export-led expansion triggered by the latest labor market reforms. The upturn in domestic demand in Spain is due not only to key external factors (depreciation of the euro, falling energy prices4, the ECB’s 
4 Spain is highly dependent on fossil fuel imports. Around one third of the total import bill corresponds to this cat-egory.
Figure 8. Contributions to GDP growth, domestic and external demand, Spain 
Source: Eurostat and author’s calculations
Figure 9. Direct contribution to GDP growth of public demand, Spain 
Source: Eurostat and author’s calculations
quantitative easing policy5), but also to having 
abandoned fiscal austerity in 2015-2016. As can be seen in Figure 9, in 2015 Spain 
implemented a noticeable expansionary fiscal policy, with a 1% positive contribution of public demand to GDP growth.
5 The impact of this measure is particularly relevant in an economy where millions of households link their mort-gages to variable interest rates.
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The stylized facts seen in the Spanish economy do not exactly match the orthodox assumptions reviewed in section 2.1. Wage devaluation has only partially translated into improved price competitiveness. Another part has gone towards increasing corporations’ 
profit margins, thus reinforcing the downward trend in the wage share. Finally, although there has been some improvement in external competitiveness, it has not triggered the desired export-led recovery, since it is domestic demand that has proven to be the main driver of growth.  
3. Functional income distribution 
and aggregate demand in Spain. In this section, we estimate the effect of a change in functional income distribution on aggregate demand. We use these estimates to gauge whether the internal devaluation pol-icy implemented in the 2010-2016 period is suited or otherwise to stimulating economic growth.
3.1 Theoretical framework: an extend-
ed Bhaduri-Marglin model Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) analyzed the ef-fects of changes in functional income distribu-tion on consumption, investment and econom-ic growth. The starting point for their model is a basic fact: salary has a twin dimension in our economy, being at the same time both a cost to business and the main determinant of private household consumption. Said authors study the contradictory impact of a distribu-tive change on the components of aggregate demand.Given an increase in wage share, consumption will rise as the propensity to consume out of wages is higher than the propensity to con-
sume out of profits. In addition, an increase in wage share will have the opposite effect on the demand for investment (being negative, due to increased costs, and positive due to the ac-celerator effect6). Finally, net exports might fall 6 According to the accelerator effect, an increase in ag-gregate demand results in a proportionately larger rise in capital investment.
should the increase in wage share come with a loss of price competitiveness. Therefore, the net effect of an increase in the wage share will depend on whether the 
elasticity of investment vis-à-vis profits, and net exports elasticity vis-à-vis changes in relative prices, are large enough to offset the expansionary effect on consumption. In this section, we obtain an empirical estimation of these elasticities for the case of the Spanish economy. Real aggregate demand (Y) consists of con-sumption spending (C), investment (I), net ex-ports (NX) and government spending (G). The demand exerted by the public sector is consid-ered an exogenous factor and thus we write aggregate demand as follows (where Ω is the wage share, and Z other control variables): (1)Our goal is to analyze how total demand chang-
es when the wage share rises or falls. The final impact on aggregate demand of an increase in the wage share is the result of two types of ef-
fects: first, the direct influence of this change on each component of aggregate demand, as-suming that total income remains constant, and second, the multiplier effect; consump-tion, investment and net exports alter as a con-sequence of second round effects. This can be written as follows: 
(2)The second term of this expression is the sum of the partial effects of income distribution on each of the components of demand, while the 
first term (µ) is the multiplier effect. Having es-timated this equation, the results will allow us to ascertain whether the Spanish economy be-
haves as wage-led or profit-led, as well as the consequences of the wage policy applied dur-ing the period of internal devaluation.We estimate separate equations for consump-tion, investment, prices, imports and exports. The wage share is, either directly or indirectly, 
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an explanatory variable in all these functions, together with other variables. We incorporate 
financial variables in the consumption and in-vestment functions, in line with some previ-ous research (Onaran et al, 2011; Nishi, 2012; Stockhammer and Wildauer, 2016). The coef-
ficients estimated in each equation reflect the marginal effect of aggregate demand on each component, of a one percentage point increase in the wage share7, assuming that total income initially remains constant. The consumption function is: (3)where the determinants are wages (W), prof-its (R), household debt growth ( Dh) and the household debt-to-GDP ratio (DhY), and 
We consider consumption to be induced by the level of income, distinguishing between 
income from wages and income from profits. 
Specifically, we expect both W and R to have a positive effect on consumption, but since the propensity to consume from wages is likely to 
be higher than from profits, consumption will increase if total income does likewise or if we have a distributive change that is favorable to wages.
The influence of debt on the consumption function is contradictory, as noted by different authors (Hein, 2012; Vasudevan, 2016; Pal-ley, 1994; Stockhammer and Wildauer, 2016). 
Household debt provides a source of finance for consumption, increasing disposable in-come, although its accumulation also leads to a growth in stock liabilities for households, with a debt service that can be a constraint for con-sumption (especially when over-leverage oc-curs). As Palley (1994) points out, increases in the level of borrowing are expansionary if the direct demand effect induced by new credit 
flow exceeds lost consumption spending aris-ing from the amount of additional interest needed to service the extra debt. Therefore, we expect household debt growth ( Dh) to af-
7 In fact, the estimated coefficients are elasticities, and marginal effects are obtained after some transformation, as will be seen.
fect consumption positively, and we expect the stock of household debt (DhY) to have a nega-tive impact on consumption.Household debt affects consumption in two ways. First, consumer debt directly boosts household consumption. Second, mortgage debt in Spain during the real estate bubble fre-quently covered 100% of the property value 
or even more, as it was often used to finance other durable consumptions (such as cars, domestic appliances or furniture). The invest-ment function is: 
(4)where the determining factors are income 
(Y), profit share ( ), long term interest rates (r), household debt growth ( Dh), corporate debt growth ( Dc) and private debt-to-GDP ratio (DpY). We expect all these factors to in-
fluence investment positively, except for in-terest rates and the stock of debt (private debt-to-GDP ratio). That is to say, we expect 
Income is used as a proxy for expected de-mand, in line with the accelerator effect. In 
addition, we use profit share as an indicator of 
profitability. Private debt is the sum of household and cor-porate debt. In a country like Spain which has experienced a housing bubble, investment will be strongly determined not only by corporate debt but also by household debt (much of the investment made by the country before the crisis was residential investment). In this case, the effect linked to the stock debt is given by the total private debt-to-GDP ratio (DpY). Net exports are: 
 (5)Net exports will depend positively on the in-come of the rest of the world (Yf), as this in-creases exports, and will depend negatively on national income (Y), since it sparks an increase in imports without affecting exports. 
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The relationship between export and import prices also proves decisive. Export prices are inversely related to net exports, since a fall in these prices will mean higher exports. More-over, we expect import prices to be directly related to net exports, given that an increase in import prices will cut imports. In addition, export prices will depend, as will domestic prices, on ULC. Thus, the wage share will af-fect external competitiveness, such that an in-crease in ULC will reduce net exports.
3.2 Related empirical literatureThe Bhaduri-Marglin model has become wide-ly used, resulting in abundant empirical litera-ture aimed at determining the macroeconomic consequences of redistribution towards prof-its or wages. Notable surveys of the empirical studies car-ried out in the literature can be found in Hein and Vogel (2008), Onaran et al. (2011), Onaran and Galanis (2012), Lavoie and Stockhammer (2013), Stockhammer and Onaran (2012), Stockhammer (2015) and Blecker (2016).This empirical literature has adopted a range of approaches. We seek to identify three essen-tial aspects in this literature in order to better situate our work: the case studies analyzed, the estimation methods used and the different 
specification of the models. First, most empirical studies to date have fo-cused on OECD developed countries (Stock-hammer et al., 2009; Onaran et al., 2011; Stockhammer et al., 2011; Stockhammer and Stehrer, 2011; Hein and Vogel, 2008; Naaste-pad and Storm, 2006; Ederer and Stockham-mer, 2007; Bowles and Boyer, 1995).  Periph-eral eurozone countries have rarely been included in the analyses. Some notable excep-tions are Stockhammer and Wildauer (2016), as well as Onaran and Obst (2016). This lat-ter study analyzes the EU15 member-states. Together with Naastepad and Storm (2006), these are the only two papers in the literature to consider the case of Spain in the context of a country-group study. Most of this literature, both for individual and 
for country-group studies, concludes that ag-gregate demand is mainly wage-led: Naastepad and Storm (2006) for Germany, France, Italy, the UK, the Netherlands and Spain; Hein and Vogel (2008) for Germany, France, the UK, the US; Stockhammer et al. (2011) for Germany; Ederer and Stockhammer (2007) for France; Stockhammer and Stehrer (2011) for Germa-ny, France, the US, Japan, Canada, Australia; Stockhammer et al. (2009) for the eurozone; Onaran and Galanis (2012) for the main OECD economies. Moreover, even small open econo-
mies that may be profit-led in a single country analysis become wage-led when considered in external interaction with other trading part-ners, since OECD countries have strong trade links with one another (Onaran and Galanis 2012; Onaran and Obst, 2016; Onaran and Stockhammer, 2016). The latter would be par-ticularly noticeable in the case of the eurozone.Second, and relative to the estimation meth-ods, the empirical literature can be grouped 
into two estimation strategies. The first group of works (Onaran and Stockhammer, 2005; Barbosa-Filho and Taylor, 2006; Nishi, 2012; Kiefer and Rada, 2014; Carvalho and Rezai, 2014) uses structural vector autoregression (VAR) models of simultaneous equations, in order to estimate a full economic model.Our work, however, belongs to a second group (Onaran et al., 2011; Stockhammer et al., 2009; Stockhammer et al., 2011; Hein and Vogel, 2008; Naastepad and Storm, 2006): those that only examine the goods market by estimating single equations for consumption, investment, exports and imports (functional income dis-tribution is assumed to be exogenous in these 
studies). This approach better reflects how the effects of changes in the wage share affect eco-nomic growth. Hartwig (2014), Rada and Kiefer (2015) and Stockhammer and Wildauer (2016) are among the few studies to use panel data methodology for estimating collective equations for a group 
of OECD countries. These studies also confirm that demand regimes are likely to be wage-led in OECD economies.
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Thirdly, we turn our attention to the specifica-tion of the models. Bhaduri-Marglin literature mainly uses traditional determinants to ex-plain consumption, investment and net export 
functions (including wages, profit, income, interest rates, ULC and prices). Nevertheless, post-Keynesian literature has paid little atten-tion to other factors (such as personal income distribution, asset prices, wealth effects or pri-vate debt). The implications of not considering these effects when describing an economy as 
wage-led or profit-led may be important, since the reported results may suffer from omitted variable bias8.  Onaran et al. (2011) and Stockhammer and Wildauer (2016) extend the Bhaduri-Marglin 
model to include financial variables, and find strong effects of debt in the aggregate demand of major OECD countries. These economies still remain mainly wage-led after including 
financial control variables. Nishi (2012) finds 
that Japan is a profit-led and debt-burdened economy for the 1990s and 2000s. 
3.3 Data and estimation strategyWe estimate our model with quarterly data obtained from Eurostat, for the period 1995-2016. The main objective of using quarterly data is to increase the size of our sample in or-der to better evaluate the internal devaluation policy followed during the period 2010-20169. Other authors have also used quarterly data in order to explicitly focus on a short term analy-sis (Stockhammer and Stehrer, 2011).We use the following variables for the econo-metric estimations: real GDP (Y), household 
consumption (C), private gross fixed capital formation (I), adjusted employee compensa-tion (W)10, adjusted operating surplus (R), 
8 For an interesting discussion on the importance of con-
sidering financial variables in the theoretical and empirical 
debate on wage-led or profit-led regimes, see Hein (2016).
9 The early years of the crisis, 2008-2009, are not included in 
the analysis since during that period an internal devaluation 
policy was not followed. Moreover, an expansionary policy 
was implemented at the fiscal level.
10 Adjusted wages are calculated as real compensation per 
employee multiplied by total employment. The unadjusted 
share of labor compensation in GDP underestimates the la-
bor share, since part of the mixed income is remuneration 
of the self-employed. 
profit share (π), long term interest rates (r), nominal unit labor costs (ULC), exports (X), imports (M), price of exports (Px), import prices (Pm), total GDP of OECD countries (YW), household debt (Dh), corporate debt (Dc), household debt-to-GDP ratio (DhY) and 
private debt-to-GDP ratio (DpY).  Definitions and statistical sources are provided in Table A1 in Annex 1. Whenever possible, we use sea-sonally adjusted statistical series, and all the 
variables in our estimates are deflated by the 
GDP deflator (or by its corresponding deflator in the case of exports and imports). Income of 
OECD countries is deflated by their own GDP 
deflators.We apply a single-equation approach, estimat-ing a different function for each component of aggregate demand and assuming functional income distribution to be exogenous. This sin-gle-equation approach allows us to isolate the partial effects on each component of aggregate demand.In order to avoid the risk of spurious correla-tions, time series econometric models require variables to be stationary. For this purpose, it 
is usual in the literature to take the first differ-ence transformation of log variables. We use a logarithmic transformation of the series, but since we are working with quarterly data we 
do not take the first difference with the previ-ous quarter, but with the equivalent quarter of the previous year. That is, we take the fourth difference of the series11. For those variables with no presence of unit 
roots in the Dickey-Fuller test (profit share, household debt-to-GDP ratio and private debt-to-GDP ratio), the fourth difference need not be taken, and only the logarithmic transforma-tion is used12.To check for the possible existence of autocor-relation, we apply the Breusch-Godfrey test. When autocorrelation is detected, we add an 
11 For a more detailed analysis on this issue, when using quarterly data, see Stockhammer and Stehrer (2011).12 We also applied the Engle-Granger cointegration test to verify the possibility of estimating error-correction mod-els (ECM). However, this test failed to provide evidence of cointegration.
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autoregressive term AR (1) to the equation, 
and use the coefficients resulting from the Co-chrane-Orcutt estimate in the equation which 
is finally estimated. We use robust estimators of the standard errors when heteroskedastic-ity is detected.Having expressed all variables as the fourth 
difference of logarithms, the estimated coeffi-cients are elasticities. Since we are interested in the marginal effects of a change in wage share, we transform these elasticities using the actual values of the sample. The variables esti-
mated are kept in the reported specifications 
even when they are not statistically significant (although they are computed, in these cases, as null variables when calculating the marginal effects).
3.4 ResultsThe results of our estimates are presented be-low. We divide our analysis into two periods: 
first, we analyze the sample as a whole (1995-2016). Second, we focus on estimating our equations exclusively for the period of internal devaluation (2010-2016). Table 2 presents the 
coefficients corresponding to the estimated equations for both periods.
Consumption function:
 (6)
As can be seen in the coefficients reported in Table 2, the elasticity of consumption with re-spect to an increase in wage income is positive 
and statistically significant. In contrast, the 
effect of profit income on consumption is not 
statistically significant. This happens for the whole sample, and also occurs for the period 2010-2016. Thus, a rise in the wage share positively affects consumption, as noted in other studies for other OECD countries (Naastepad and Storm, 2006; Hein and Vogel, 2008; Stockhammer et 
al. 2009 and 2011; Onaran and Galanis, 2012), although in these cases the elasticity out of 
profits was statistically significant. Similar re-sults to ours are also obtained by Onaran and 
Obst (2016) and Naastepad and Storm (2006) for the case of Spain. The effect of debt is as expected. On the one 
hand, the evolution of household credit flow (dlogDh) has a positive impact on consump-tion, with an elasticity of around 0.36, similar to wage income. Household debt-to-GDP ratio (logDhY), which represents the stock of debt, is negatively related to the level of consump-tion. This result is even more evident for the period 2010-2016, with higher elasticities 
for both coefficients, showing the expected effect of over-leverage of households during a balance sheet recession. These results are also consistent with the outcomes reported in similar studies (Stockhammer and Wildauer, 2016). 
Investment function         (7)The positive relationship predicted theoreti-cally between income (Y, as a proxy of expect-ed demand) and private investment is clearly 
significant in the two periods analyzed. These results are similar to those obtained by other studies: changes in aggregate demand appear 
to be the main driver of gross fixed capital formation for OECD and eurozone countries (Stockhammer et al., 2009 and 2011; Onaran and Galanis, 2012), and for the case of Spain (Onaran and Obst; 2016; Naastepad and Storm, 2006)13.To estimate the effect of a pro-capital distribu-
tion on investment, we use the first lag of the 
profit share ratio (π), as is often done in the literature. This indicator is the one that works best among the different proxies tried. Never-
theless, the relationship between profit share and investment is less clear. For the sample 
13 It should be noted that although the coefficient of in-
come (3.54) is greater than the profit share coefficient (0.27), we must take into account not only the value of 
these coefficients but also the variability of these vari-ables over a period of time in order to understand which 
exerts a greater influence on investment (i.e., if income is 
relatively constant over a period, changes in profitability will explain changes in investment).
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as a whole, we obtain a positive coefficient (0.27), although it is necessary to increase the 
significance threshold to 10% in order to con-sider this effect. Naastepad and Storm (2006) already reported a similar result a decade ago when examining the case of Spain for the 1960-2000 period14.When analyzing the sub-period of internal 
devaluation, this coefficient is not significant even at the 10% statistical level. This is due to the fact that during these years, we observe a relative disconnection between the two vari-ables, as shall be seen later in more detail. A 
similar breakdown of the profit-investment nexus since the start of the Great Recession is noted by Onaran and Obst (2016) for EU15 Member States.Interest rates lack explanatory capacity in our estimates (whether we take real or nomi-nal, long or short term). Similar results are obtained in other studies in the literature (Onaran and Galanis, 2012). This is probably due to the particularity of the sample period analyzed: during the crisis, in the context of a liquidity trap, Spanish investment remained at very low levels although interest rates were much lower than during the years of the hous-ing bubble. Nevertheless, including the inter-est rate in the investment function seeks to re-
flect an economic effect that is in fact already contained in the evolution of household and corporate debt. 
Testing with the specification and with the 
lag structure of both profit share and interest rates failed to improve the results obtained for the estimates. With regard to the effect of private debt on in-vestment, some, but not all, of our initial hy-
potheses are confirmed. Neither corporate debt growth (dlogDc) nor the stock effect of 
private debt (logDpY) show significant coeffi-cients for either of the two periods analyzed. 14 These authors explain the low intensity of the profit–investment nexus as a typical pattern of “coordinated 
market economies” (according to the classification de-veloped by the Variety of Capitalism approach). In such 
economies, profitability is less important for investment than in “liberal market economies”, since they rely on 
bank-based financial systems.
However, household debt growth (dlogDh) –
mainly, mortgage debt– is again confirmed as a major determinant of private investment. As is well known, a large part of private investment in Spain was residential investment for the pe-riod 1995-2007, also making corporate invest-ment dependent on real estate construction.  
Domestic/export prices:Changes in domestic and export prices will partially depend on changes in nominal ULC (i.e., changes in income distribution). Said changes in prices prove decisive for estimat-ing the net export function, since net exports depend on the relation between domestic and export prices. 
We first seek to find a relationship between changes in distribution and changes in prices and, second, between these changes in prices and the behavior of net exports. Thus, we can measure the change in net exports by each per-centage point of change in the wage share.We estimate a similar function for domestic and export prices:                                     (8a)  (8b)Companies set their prices by charging a mark-up on their production costs. These produc-tion costs can be decomposed at an aggregate level into ULC and unit costs associated with imported intermediate goods (PM). In Table 2, we can see how ULC are clearly sig-
nificant and positive in the case of the domes-tic price function for the two periods studied. 
A coefficient of 0.13 (clearly below 1) for the period 2010-2016 is consistent with the out-comes of section 2.2 (see Figure 4): the reduc-
tion in ULC is only partially reflected in a re-
duction of the GDP deflator.If labor costs are only partly transferred to do-
mestic prices, the reflection is even weaker in 
export prices: ULC are not statistically signifi-cant in the export price function. This is con-
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sistent with what was seen in Section 2 (Fig-ure 7): a reduction in ULC does not necessarily imply improved price competitiveness. As can be seen in Table 2, the main determinant of ex-port prices is import prices15.These results of domestic and export price functions are again quite similar to those re-ported in the literature for other countries similar to Spain (Stockhammer et al., 2009 and 2011; Onaran and Galanis, 2012; Onaran and Obst; 2016). Although in many of these cases, 
ULC are statistically significant in the export price function (since longer annual series are used for the estimations), this variable is rare-ly a strong determinant of export prices com-pared to import prices.
Export / import functions:          As explanatory variables, the export and im-port functions include, respectively, the income of the remaining OECD countries (YW), na-tional income (Y), as well as the ratio between export prices (PX) and import prices (PM). As Stockhammer et al. (2011) did for the German 
case, in the import equation we take the first lag of the PX/PM ratio, since the expected be-havior of this variable is thus reinforced.          
(9)  (10)
The coefficients of these functions have the expected signs. Exports depend positively and intensely on the rest of the world’s income, and negatively on relative prices. However, the co-
efficient of prices is not statistically significant in either of the two periods. Income elasticity of exports is much greater than price elastic-ity. This is consistent with previous research 
on the wage-led and profit-led approach (Stockhammer et al., 2011; Onaran and Gala-nis, 2012; Onaran and Obst; 2016), and for the case of Spain (Naastepad and Storm, 2006). It 15 It should be noted here that the amount of intermedi-ate goods imported by the Spanish economy is relatively high. The import content of Spanish exports is 39% ac-cording to the Bank of Spain (2012b: pp. 89)
is also consistent with specific research on the Spanish external sector (Uxó et al. 2014; Uxó 
et al. 2016). Even mainstream authors and in-stitutions who are enthusiastic about internal devaluation (Bank of Spain, 2012a and 2015) obtain similar results: price competitiveness only partly explains the evolution of exports.The behavior of the import function is similar, 
and the sign of the coefficients is as expected. 
Domestic income has a significant effect and is the main driver of imports. The elasticity of 
prices is significant for both periods, although it is much lower.
Table 2. Regression results
 1995-2016  2010-2016




PRICE XPORT IMPORT   
dlogW             0.3122***                0.3551***                   
 -0.0945                -0.1194                   
dlogR              0.0414                -0.1141                   
 -0.0501                -0.084                   
logDhY -0.103**                -0.2121***                    -0.0671                -0.0675                   
dlogDh 0.3581*** 1.1453***                0.7273** 0.5151                    -0.1208 -0.4331                -0.2614 -1.1981                   
dlogY 3.5400**** 3.8868****  3.3409** 1.9823****
 -0.7159 -0.7674  -1.7128 -0.3914
dr 0.0014   0.0016  
 -0.0048   -0.0108  
logπ(t-1) 0.2662*                 1.6972                   
 -0.1451                 -1.0828                   
dlogDc -0.0252                 0.0069                    -0.2248                 -0.2612                   
logDpY -0.0205   0.3159   -0.1928   -0.396  
dlogULC 0.1483**** 0.0997                 0.1300** -0.0444                   
 -0.0398 -0.0794                 -0.0467 -0.1259                   
dlogPM -0.0043 0.4269****                 -0.0329 0.2784**                   
 -0.0179 -0.0376                 -0.0272 -0.1053                   
dlogYW 2.6549****                 1.2129                   
 -0.23                 -0.7541                   
dlogPXPM -0.2125                 -0.0036                    -0.1383                 -0.2405                   
dlogPXPM (t-1) 0.5193**   0,4853* -0.2541  -0.3036
N 64 64 80 80 80 79 24 25 24 24 24 24
r2 0.3207 0.5583 0.1866 0.6266 0.5551 0.4346 0.8181 0.7691 0.3001 0.2531 0.0524 0.5478
F 6.9634 8.967 6.9438 64.6178 112.8054 15.7967 30.91 14.5355 6.096 3.558 1.5125 15.0688
pvalue 0.0349 0.0053 0.1339 0.0154 0.0088 0.0613 0.0022 0.0016 0.1502 0.2422 0.4733 0.064
ll 220.3885 144.4759 340.5613 271.8076 193.0109 167.4863 87.0945 55.7885 104.4543 79.2862 60.1158 61.8491
rho 0.969 0.9736 0.976 0.6823 0.6656 0.8862 0.5451  0.6319 0.8174 0.6373 0.6731Standard errors in italics: * p<0.1,** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001     Source: own calculations, based on Eurostat quarterly data
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4.  Effects of internal devaluation 
policy on economic growthTo estimate the effects of internal devaluation policy on economic growth, we calculate the marginal effects of a change in functional in-come distribution. Elasticities are converted into marginal effects at the mean of our sam-
ple by multiplying the estimated coefficients by the actual values of consumption, invest-
ment, wages, profits, exports and imports. We compute the global marginal effect as noted in equation 2: 
(2)
The specific calculation of the estimated elas-ticity of consumption, investment and net ex-ports with respect to wage share can be found in Annex 2.From these calculations, we obtain that the difference in marginal consumption propensi-
ties (between wage and profit incomes) deter-mines the effect on consumption of a change in income distribution (equation 18 of Annex 2). Table 3 shows the difference in these marginal consumption propensities (cW - cR).
Table 3. Marginal effect on C/Y of a 1% increase in the W/Y ratio
 C W R βW βR cW cR cW - cR
1995-2016 138.4446 137.3436 80.95312 0.312 0.000 0.315 0.000 0.315
2010-2016 147.3102 147.033 92.32808 0.355 0.000 0.356 0.000 0.356Source: own calculations, based on Eurostat quarterly data
Estimated elasticity of investment with re-spect to wage share is given by equation 22 in Annex 2, and its empirical value for our sample is shown in Table 4.
Table 4. Marginal effect on I/Y of a 1% increase in the W/Y ratio





1995-2016 54.248 0.3387217 253.2701 0.266 -0.168
2010-2016 46.716 0.3497415 264.0674 0.000 0.000Source: own calculations, based on Eurostat quarterly data
Finally, estimated elasticity of exports and im-ports with respect to wage share is given by a long chain of linked elasticities. This chain of elasticities goes from real ULC to imports and exports, with prices being the variable that al-low such a connection, as can be seen in Annex 2. Estimated elasticity of exports and imports (equations 34 and 35 of Annex 2) are shown in Table 5. Its value is null because the respective 
coefficients have not proven significant in the previous estimations.
Table 5. Marginal effect on XN/Y of a 1% increase in the W/Y ratio


















































































1995-2016 0.148 1.174 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.519 0.000 0.390 1.553 0.321 0.288 0.000 0.000 0.000
2010-2016 0.130 1.149 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.390 1.553 0.321 0.288 0.000 0.000 0.000Note: The import content of Spanish exports is 39% according to the Bank of Spain (2012: page 54)    Source: own calculations, based on Eurostat quarterly data
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Adding the marginal effects of consumption, investment and net exports, we can measure the total effect of a percentage point increase in the wage share on private demand. How-ever, as income is also an explanatory variable in these equations, we also obtain an estimate of the implicit multiplier (µ, in equation 2)16. The ultimate effect on the economy will be the product of this multiplier for the above effect. If positive, the economy is wage-led, and if neg-
ative, the economy is profit-led.Table 6 shows the marginal effects on C/Y, I/Y and XN/Y of an increase of one percentage point in wage share. We give a value equal to 
zero to the coefficients that are not statistically 
significant in the estimates. The effect of a 1%-point increase in wage share in Spain entails an expansionary effect of 0.50 points in aggregate demand for the pe-riod 2010-2016. Therefore, the Spanish econ-omy is a wage-led economy, according to the typology of economies established by Bhaduri and Marglin (1990). Between 2010 and 2016, wage share in Spain fell by 4.3 percentage points (see Figure 1), that is, by 0.6 points each year. This means that every year the economy lost 0.3 percentage points of potential growth as a consequence of the internal devaluation policy17.As already stated, this result is similar to those obtained by many of the studies conducted for large OECD economies using the Bhadu-ri-Marglin approach (Hein and Vogel, 2008; 
16 For further details on calculating the implicit multi-plier, see Annex 3.17 For an interesting analysis of the costs of internal de-valuation in the eurozone, see Stockhammer and Soti-ropoulos (2014).
Stockhammer et al., 2011; Stockhammer and Stehrer, 2011; Onaran and Galanis, 2012). Nas-
tepaad and Storm (2006) also find the Spanish economy to be wage-led for the period 1960-2000, and Onaran and Obst (2016) present 
very similar figures for the Spanish case (in their study, the effect of a 1%-point increase in 
the profit share in Spain entails a reduction of -0.54 points in aggregate demand).Furthermore, the results of our estimates show that this wage-led character is reinforced dur-ing the period 2010-2016. One initial explana-tion for this concerns a stronger effect of the implicit multiplier, which becomes greater18 
in periods of crisis, as the literature on fiscal multipliers tends to point out (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012a and 2012b; Gerchert and Rannenberg, 2014; Martinez and Zubiri, 2014).Second, the fall in wages not only affects con-sumption but also (by means of a reversed ac-celerator effect) the demand for investment, which falls. Thirdly, the wage-led character is reinforced due to a partial disconnection between prof-its and private investment during the period 2010-2016. This partial disconnection can be observed in Figure 10, which correlates the evolution of the gross operating rate and gross 
fixed capital formation for the main NACE branches of the Spanish economy. A simi-
lar breakdown of the profit-investment link is presented by Onaran and Obst (2016) for 
18 See Annex 3.
Table 6. Total effect on demand of a 1% increase in the W/Y ratio
 
Partial effect of 
a 1% increase in 
wage share on 
C/Y
Partial effect of 
a 1% increase in 
wage share on 
I/Y
Partial effect of 
a 1% increase in 
the wage share 
on XN/Y
µ TOTAL EFFECT
 A B C D D(A+B+C)
1995-2016 0.315 -0.168 0.000 1.030 0,151
2010-2016 0.356 0.000 0.000 1.420 0,505Source: own calculations, based on Eurostat quarterly data
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EU15 Member States for the period after the Great Recession of 2007. In an economy such as Spain’s, where the private sector maintains high debt ratios, wage devaluation policies 
serve to increase profit margins and delever-age but fail to foster investment in equal mea-sure.
gous to those obtained by many other studies that follow the Bhaduri-Marglin approach to analyzing large eurozone economies. The labor market reforms of 2010, 2011 and 2012 imposed wage devaluation in Spain but did not transform the wage-led character of the economy. According to our calculations, Spain lost an average of 0.3 percentage points of GDP growth per year between 2010 and 2016 as a result of this internal devaluation policy.These outcomes are due to three important factors. First, the marginal propensity to con-sume out of wage income is invariably greater than the marginal propensity to consume out of capital income. Thus, a pro-capital income distribution reduces aggregate consumption. 
Second, although profit share has a significant statistical impact when explaining capital for-mation in the long term, private investment is 
more influenced by the evolution of income and the subsequent accelerating effect. As in-ternal devaluation reduces domestic demand, the net effect also proved detrimental to pri-vate investment during 2010-2016.
Figure 10. Gross Operating Rate (%) vs. Investment Rate (%). NACE aggregates of activities 
(2010-2014), Spain.
*Note: Gross Operating Rate, in the X axis, is defined as Gross operating surplus/turnover. Investment 
rate, in the Y axis, is defined as gross fixed capital formation /value added at factors cost. In both cases, we take the average value for the period 2010-2014. Source: Eurostat and author’s calculations
Finally, and according to our estimates, it can-not be said that the internal devaluation of the Spanish economy triggered a sustainable export-led growth recovery during the period 
2010-2016. For this period, we find no relevant effects of ULC on export prices. Nor do the lat-
ter show significant coefficients in the export equation. This is consistent with the stylized facts discussed in section 2, where we saw that the factors driving the Spanish recovery stem mainly from domestic demand. 
5.- Main conclusions and policy 
implications
Our estimates confirm that the Spanish econo-my is a wage-led economy. This result is analo-
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Third, ULC are a strong determinant of domes-tic prices, although the translation of ULC into prices was extremely limited during this pe-riod. Moreover, the impact of this variable on export prices seems even more restricted. The economic growth of major trading partners is far more relevant vis-à-vis explaining ex-ports than the change in relative prices. It thus proves crucial to bring an end to austerity and to support demand at the EU level, and not to extend the policies of internal devaluation to other member countries.One contribution of this paper lies in its hav-ing extended the Bhaduri-Marglin model to 
include financial variables. Including these variables allows for a comparison between the robust and positive effects of private credit 
flow on investment and consumption. When the economic cycle changes and the Spanish economy enters into a balance sheet recession, excessive private indebtedness helps to ex-plain the partial disconnection between prof-its and investment, since the former must be used by companies to deleverage (Goretti and Souto, 2013). This fact partially explains the reinforcement of the wage-led character of the Spanish economy in 2010-2016.Some relevant variables in our study were not 
significant for the period of internal devalu-ation (propensity to consume out of capital 
income, profit share as a determinant of in-vestment, or ULC as drivers of exports). These 
variables would probably be significant for a longer period of analysis, as many studies have shown. In any case, and as discussed in sec-tion 2, this points to the weak capacity of these factors to explain Spain’s recovery since 2015. This recovery is not the result of a supposed export-led strategy due to internal devalua-tion, but rather to the effect of other factors (depreciation of the euro, falling energy prices, the ECB’s quantitative easing policy, and a cer-
tain abandonment of fiscal austerity).For all this, it is time to re-examine the rationality of pro-capital distributional policies, and to develop an alternative policy mix based on pro-labor distributional policies in order to follow a wage-led growth strategy 
(Lavoie and Stockhammer; 2013; Onaran and Stockhammer; 2016). In addition, this might be accompanied by measures favoring the restructuring of certain corporate debt so as 
to facilitate the re-establishment of the profit-investment nexus.As pointed out by Felipe and Kumar (2011), a higher wage share does not necessarily lead to a less competitive economy (the well-known 
Kaldor’s paradox), since competitiveness also depends on unit capital costs (the ratio of the 
nominal profit rate to capital productivity) as well as on non-price factors.Pro-labor distributional policies might help to consolidate the current fragile growth of the Spanish economy, strengthening those factors that are currently driving domestic demand.
Annex 1.  Table A1- Variables, data definitions and sources
Abbreviation Full variable name Units and description Type Source Eurostat codeY Gross domestic product at market prices Chain linked volumes (2010), million euros Seasonally and calendar adjusted data Eurostat namq_10_gdpP Gross domestic product at market prices Price index (implicit deflator), 2010=100, national currency Seasonally and calendar adjusted data Eurostat namq_10_gdpC Household and NPISH final consumption expenditure Chain linked volumes (2010), million euros Seasonally and calendar adjusted data Eurostat namq_10_gdpI Private gross fixed capital formation Private sector, Current prices, million euros; deflated by GDP deflator Unadjusted data (i.e. neither seasonally adjusted nor calendar adjusted data) Eurostat nasq_10_nf_trW* Employee compensation Current prices, million units of national currency; deflated by GDP 
deflator
Seasonally and calendar adjusted data Eurostat namq_10_gdp
W Adjusted employee compensa-tion Current prices, million units of national currency; deflated by GDP deflator Seasonally and calendar adjusted data Calculated as  W *(Em-ployment/employees, domestic)R* Operating surplus and mixed income, gross Current prices, million units of national currency; deflated by GDP deflator Seasonally and calendar adjusted data Eurostat namq_10_gdpR Adjusted operating surplus and mixed income, gross Current prices, million units of national currency; deflated by GDP deflator Seasonally and calendar adjusted data Calculated from W
Ω Adjusted Wage Share % Calculated as W/Y
π Adjusted Profit Share % Calculated as R/Yr EMU convergence criterion bond yields Nominal, deflated by GDP deflator Unadjusted Eurostat irt_lt_mcby_qULC Nominal unit labor cost based on persons Index, 2010=100 Unadjusted data (i.e. neither seasonally adjusted nor calendar adjusted data) Eurostat namq_10_lp_ulcX Exports of goods and services Chain linked volumes (2010), million euros Seasonally and calendar adjusted data Eurostat namq_10_gdpM Imports of goods and services Chain linked volumes (2010), million euros Seasonally and calendar adjusted data Eurostat namq_10_gdpPX Price of exports of goods and services Price index (implicit deflator), 2010=100, national currency Seasonally and calendar adjusted data Eurostat namq_10_gdpPM Price of imports of goods and services Price index (implicit deflator), 2010=100, national currency Seasonally and calendar adjusted data Eurostat namq_10_gdpYW GDP, volumes, OECD total Index, 2010=100 Seasonally and calendar adjusted data OECD Economic Outlook, 99, June 2016Dh Household debt, stock Liabilities (loans), households, million euros, deflated by GDP defla-tor Unadjusted data (i.e. neither seasonally adjusted nor calendar adjusted data) Eurostat [nasq_10_f_bs]Dc Corporate debt, stock Liabilities (loans and debt securities), non-financial and financial cor-
porations, million euros, deflated by GDP deflator
Unadjusted data (i.e. neither seasonally adjusted nor calendar adjusted data) Eurostat [nasq_10_f_bs]DhY Household debt-to-GDP ratio % Calculated as Dh/YDpY Private debt-to-GDP ratio % Calculated as (Dh+Dc)/Y
Annex 2. Estimated elasticity of consumption, investment and net ex-
ports with respect to wage share
Consumption function:We calculate the estimated elasticity of consumption with respect to wage share, based on the consumption function used:  (3)   (11) (12)   (13) (14) (15)Taking into account the following:  (16) (17)we can replace these expressions in equation (17), and obtain the effect on consumption of a change in the distribution of income (equation 20). This effect is given by the difference in mar-
ginal consumption propensities of wage income and profit income: (18)
Investment function:We compute estimated elasticity of investment with respect to wage share in a similar way, through the following transformation:  (4) (19)
 (20)Taking into account the following,  (21)then, estimated elasticity of investment with respect to the wage share results gives equation (25): (22)
Functions of domestic prices and export prices:
The rate of inflation is affected by increases in unit labor costs (as they are partly translated into prices), and by increases in import prices:(23) 27
Moreover, wage share is equal to real unit labor costs:(24)From these two equations, and in order to calculate the elasticity of domestic and export prices with respect to wage share, we develop the following transformation. In growth rates:(25) (26)(27)
Clearing the ULC growth rate and replacing it in the equation of the inflation rate:(28)(29)
(30)
That is, keeping everything else constant, when ULC grow, both the rate of inflation and the wage 
share are modified. This expression reflects the relationship between these two latter variables.As we are interested in external competitiveness, we can also write the above equations in terms 
of export prices, and not in terms of the GDP deflator, which includes tradable and non-tradable goods: (8b)(31)
(32)
Export and import functions:The export and import functions were as follows: (9)(33)
These equations are expressed in terms of differences of logarithms. Thus, the estimated coeffi-
cients are elasticities. If we join these two expressions with the previous ones, the change in Ω is associated with a change in export prices, said change affecting both exports and imports. We can write this as follows: (34) (35)
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Annex 3. Calculating the multiplierThe marginal effects on consumption, investment, and net exports resulting from an increase in wage share do not take place with a constant level of income. It is obvious that by increasing these components of aggregate demand, equilibrium income will not remain constant. This increase in income will lead to second round effects, resulting in the well-known multiplier effect.To incorporate this effect into our analysis, we must begin by estimating the marginal effect of an increase in income on consumption, investment and net exports. For the latter two variables, it can be obtained almost directly, since in the estimated equations the income level was an explana-tory variable. We can therefore transform these elasticities into marginal effects following the usual procedure:(36)
(37)
In the case of consumption, however, the effect of an increase in income, assuming that the func-tional distribution remains constant, must be calculated from the consumption function:(3)   (12)  (38)
The multiplier (μ) is an expression in which these three effects are taken into account, and which 
depends on coefficients we have already estimated: (39)
In Table A2, we present the calculation of the multiplier. For this calculation, we use the mean val-ues of the sample for the corresponding period.
Table A2. Calculation of the multiplier, Spain
 W cW cR αY m1 I/Y M/Y cW*W cR * (1-
W)
βY * I/Y m1 * M/Y μ
1995-2016 0.57 0.32 0.00 3.54 3.89 0.23 0.25 0.18 0.00 0.82 0.97 1.03
2010-2016 0.56 0.36 0.00 3.34 1.98 0.19 0.26 0.20 0.00 0.62 0.52 1.42Source: own calculations, based on Eurostat quarterly data
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